In re Discipline of Anderson, No. JD 14 (July 29, 1999).

July 1999        DISCIPLINE OF ANDERSON                 1
                     Cause No. JD 14

                  [No. JD 14. En Banc.]
     Argued February 9, 1999.  Decided July 29, 1999.
               In the Matter of the ) JD No. 14
           Disciplinary Proceedings )
                            Against )
                                    )
   The Honorable Grant L. Anderson, ) En Banc
                                    )
             Pierce County Superior )
                       Court Judge. ) Filed: July 29, 1999

              [Headnotes copyright 1999 - CD Law]

-Headnote-
[1]  Judges -- Discipline -- Commission on Judicial Conduct --
     Findings and Conclusions -- Review by Supreme Court.  A
     judicial disciplinary proceeding conducted by the
     Commission on Judicial Conduct is reviewed de novo by the
     Supreme Court.  De novo review means the court is not
     bound by the Commission's findings of fact and
     conclusions of law.  Instead, the court independently
     evaluates the evidence in the Commission's record to
     decide whether the judge committed the charged conduct,
     whether the judge's conduct warrants sanctioning, and the
     proper sanction to impose.  In evaluating the evidence,
     the court gives considerable weight to the Commission's
     credibility determinations; de novo review does not mean
     that the court holds a new evidentiary hearing.  In every
     case, however, the Supreme Court retains the ultimate
     authority to decide whether and to what extent discipline
     should be imposed.
[2]  Judges -- Discipline -- Evidence -- Degree of Proof --
     Burden of Proof.  In a disciplinary proceeding against a
     judge, the Commission on Judicial Conduct bears the
     burden of proving the facts of the case by clear, cogent,
     and convincing evidence.
[3]  Judges -- Discipline -- Nonjudicial Conduct -- Integrity
     of Judiciary.  Canons 1 and 2(A) of the Code of Judicial
     Conduct, which emphasize judicial integrity and
     independence, apply to the extrajudicial conduct of
     judges as well as their judicial conduct.  Extrajudicial
     conduct is violative of the canons if an articulable
     nexus exists between the conduct and the performance of
     judicial duties.
[4]  Judges -- Discipline -- Code of Judicial Conduct --
     Financial Reporting Requirement -- Compensation -- What
     Constitutes -- Loan Repayment Assistance.  A judge's
     acceptance of funds from a third party that are given by
     the third party with the intent of assisting the judge in
     paying a financial obligation constitutes compensation
     for purposes of the financial disclosure requirement of
     Canon 6(C) of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
[5]  Judges -- Discipline -- Sanction -- Recommendation of
     Commission -- Effect.  While the Supreme Court will give
     serious consideration to the Commission on Judicial
     Conduct's recommended sanction for an act of judicial
     misconduct, the court is not bound by the recommendation.
[6]  Judges -- Discipline -- Sanction -- Ultimate
     Determination -- Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court
     independently determines the sanction to impose on a
     judge for an act of misconduct after the Commission on
     Judicial Conduct has conducted a hearing on the charges
     against the judge and has recommended a sanction to the
     court.
[7]  Judges -- Discipline -- Sanction -- Factors.  In
     determining the sanction to impose on a judge for an act
     of misconduct, the Supreme Court considers several
     factors: (1) whether the misconduct is an isolated
     instance or is part of a pattern of conduct; (2) the
     nature, extent, and frequency of the misconduct; (3)
     whether the misconduct occurred inside or outside of the
     courtroom; (4) whether the misconduct occurred in the
     judge's official capacity or private life; (5) whether
     the judge has acknowledged or admitted to the misconduct;
     (6) whether the judge has made an effort to rectify the
     misconduct; (7) the judge's length of service on the
     bench; (8) the existence of prior complaints about the
     judge; (9) the effect of the misconduct on the judiciary;
     and (10) whether the judicial office was exploited to
     satisfy personal desires.
[8]  Judges -- Discipline -- Sanction -- Removal -- Egregious
     Misconduct.  Removal from office is an appropriate
     sanction for a judge who engages in an extended pattern
     of conduct involving dishonest behavior unbecoming of a
     judge and who refuses to acknowledge the enormity of the
     effect of the misconduct on the integrity of the
     judiciary.

  GUY, C.J., and JOHNSON, ALEXANDER, TALMADGE, and SANDERS,
JJ., did not participate in the disposition of this case.

  Nature of Action:  The Commission on Judicial Conduct
charged a superior court judge with violating the Code of
Judicial Conduct by accepting a friend's offer to make the
monthly payments for an automobile purchased by the judge
during a time when the judge, as the trustee of a decedent's
estate, was negotiating with the friend to reduce the price of
an estate asset being sold to the friend; by continuing to
serve as president of the estate's corporations for several
months after becoming a superior court judge; and by failing
to report his receipt of the car payments on his public
disclosure filings for three successive years.  The judge
contested the charges.  Following a hearing, the Commission
entered findings of fact and conclusions of law; ordered the
judge censured, to attend a judicial ethics course, and to
amend his filings with the Public Disclosure Commission; and
recommended that the judge be suspended for four months
without pay.  The Commission's decision was filed with the
Supreme Court on May 15, 1998.

  Supreme Court:  Holding that the judge's conduct violated
the Code of Judicial Conduct, but that the recommended
sanction was too lenient, the court orders the judge removed
from office.
  Byrnes & Keller, L.L.P., by Paul R. Taylor, for the
Commission on Judicial Conduct.
  Kurt M. Bulmer, for Judge Anderson.

  [As amended by an order of the Supreme Court August 12,
1999.]
  MADSEN, J. --  Pierce County Superior Court Judge Grant L.
Anderson challenges a determination by the Commission on
Judicial Conduct (Commission) that his extra-judicial
activities relating to a deceased client's estate violated
the Canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The Commission
ordered that Judge Anderson be censured and recommended
suspension for four months without pay. Additionally, the
Commission ordered Judge Anderson to attend a judicial
ethics course and ordered him to amend filings with the
Public Disclosure Commission as a "course of corrective
action." Commission Decision at 9. We agree that Judge
Anderson's conduct violated the Canons, however, we believe
that removal from office is the proper sanction. Accordingly,
we order his removal and vacate the Commission's order of
corrective action.

2             IN RE DISCIPLINE OF ANDERSON      July 1999
                     Cause No. JD 14

                          FACTS
  From 1977 to 1992, Judge Anderson was a municipal court
judge for the City of Fircrest in Pierce County. During that
time, Judge Anderson was also in private practice. In connection
with his practice, Judge Anderson drafted the will of Charles
Hoffman, his longtime client. Mr. Hoffman's will designated
Judge Anderson as personal representative of his estate upon his
death. In 1989, Mr. Hoffman died and Judge Anderson assumed the
responsibility of personal representative of the estate.
  The estate included three business corporations: (1)
Hoffman-Stevenson, Inc., which owned the real estate and
building housing a bowling alley operation in Tacoma,
Washington; (2) Pacific Lanes, Inc., which operated the
bowling alley and leased the real property from
Hoffman-Stevenson, Inc.; and (3) Surfside Inn, Inc. Judge
Anderson installed himself as president of the three
companies.
  On January 8, 1993, Judge Anderson was sworn in as Pierce
County Superior Court Judge. Judge Anderson continued to serve
as president of the estate's corporations and continued to
participate in the estate's business until mid-October 1993. The
Code of Judicial Conduct (CJC) require judges to regulate their
extra-judicial activities to minimize the risk of conflict with
their judicial duties and, thus, strongly discourage judges from
serving as officers or otherwise working on behalf of any
business. CJC 5(C)(3).

July 1999     IN RE DISCIPLINE OF ANDERSON              3
                     Cause No. JD 14

  Judge Anderson's continued involvement with the estate's
business corporations led to allegations that he violated Canons
1, 2(A), 5(C)(3) and 6(C). The Judicial Conduct Commission
conducted a five-day fact-finding hearing based on complaints
to the Commission. The hearing focused on the circumstances and
facts surrounding three events: the sale of the bowling alley
business; Judge Anderson's acceptance of car loan payments from
1993 to 1995; and Judge Anderson's continued role as president
of three corporations for 10 months after he was sworn-in as
Pierce County Superior Court Judge.

Sale of the bowling alley business
  Judge Anderson testified that sometime in April 1992, he
approached his friend William Hamilton, a Tacoma area banker
and investor, about selling the estate's bowling alley
business. The two were good friends who often talked about
business ventures. Judge Anderson believed that due to
various problems with the building, such as asbestos and
poor sewage, marketing the sale of the bowling alley
business would be difficult. Moreover, Judge Anderson
thought it would be too complicated to sell the business
through conventional financing arrangements, so he
approached Mr. Hamilton, who expressed interest in buying
the bowling alley.
  In August 1992, Judge Anderson and Mr. Hamilton reviewed the
first draft of the Business Acquisition and Lease Agreement.
This first draft had handwritten notes indicating what
appear to be revisions, such as changes to the

4             IN RE DISCIPLINE OF ANDERSON      July 1999
                     Cause No. JD 14

closing date from September 30, 1992 to September 1, 1992.
The parties did not sign the document.
  On August 26, 1992, Judge Anderson and Mr. Hamilton reviewed a
second draft of the Business Acquisition and Lease Agreement.
This document appeared to reflect changes from the first draft,
such as the closing date of September 1, 1992. Judge Anderson
and Mr. Hamilton both signed this second draft. On September 19,
1992, a third and final draft of the Business Acquisition and
Lease Agreement was reviewed and signed by both Judge Anderson
and Mr. Hamilton. This last draft of the agreement was modified
to reflect additional changes. Specifically, the document
provided that closing would occur after certain conditions were
met, such as receipt of state and local gambling and liquor
permits. Additionally, the final agreement provided that the
purchaser of the bowling alley would be Pacific Recreation
Enterprises, Inc., of which Mr. Hamilton was the sole
shareholder and president.
  Although the last Business Acquisition and Lease Agreement
signed by Judge Anderson and Mr. Hamilton included an open-ended
closing date, Anderson and Hamilton both testified that they
actually intended the closing date to be September 1, 1992. In
order to reflect the delay in closing, Judge Anderson testified
that he and Mr. Hamilton anticipated that an adjustment to the
sale price would be necessary and that both he and Mr. Hamilton
understood the sale to be contingent upon Mr. Hamilton's
receiving cash flows from the bowling alley during its fall
season. Judge Anderson further testified that after September 1,

July 1999     IN RE DISCIPLINE OF ANDERSON              5
                     Cause No. JD 14

1992, he basically had nothing to do with the business or
management of the bowling alley.
  Judge Anderson continued to conduct business on behalf of
Pacific Lanes, Inc.; however, and on September 28, 1992, he
submitted applications for a gambling permit1 and liquor
license transfer /2  which were contingencies of the
Business Acquisition and Lease Agreement.
  On October 28, 1992, Judge Anderson responded by letter to the
Washington State Gambling Commission's inquiry about his
authority to operate on behalf of the Hoffman estate. In that
letter, Judge Anderson refers to the "pending sale of Pacific
Lanes [Inc.]" Ex. 2.
  On December 4, 1992, Judge Anderson and Mr. Hamilton
completed a bill of sale for the bowling alley business in
the amount of $300,000. /3  Supporting documents included a
purchaser's closing statement showing a cash payment of
$50,000 signed by Mr. Hamilton on behalf of Pacific
Recreation Enterprises, Inc., and a promissory note in the
amount of $250,000.
  On December 9, 1992, Judge Anderson, as president of Pacific
Lanes, Inc., signed a security agreement with First
Interstate for the promissory note in the amount of
$250,000.

_______________
  1 The Washington State Gambling Commission did not indicate
its intent to approve the application for a gambling permit
until November 12, 1992.

  2 A liquor license was obtained from the Washington State
Liquor Control Board by Judge Anderson on July 1, 1992, but
required an application for transfer of the license as a
condition of the Business and Acquisition and Lease Agreement.

  3 A 1989 appraisal for the bowling alley business, including
the building and land in which it was located, estimated the
aggregate price of all three at $1,334,000. Although the record
is unclear as to how Judge Anderson and Mr. Hamilton arrived at
the price of $300,000 for the bowling alley business, Judge
Anderson testified that he approached Mr. Hamilton about selling
him the business, building, and land as an entire package for
$1,000,000.

6             IN RE DISCIPLINE OF ANDERSON      July 1999
                     Cause No. JD 14

  On or about the first week of January 1993, the
Hoffman estate was closed and its assets, including the stock
of Hoffman-Stevenson, Inc. and Pacific Lanes, Inc., were
transferred to a trust. Mr. Fisher, Judge Anderson's former
law partner, was appointed trustee.
  On March 9, 1993, Mr. Fisher held a meeting at his office with
Judge Anderson, Mr. Hamilton and his accountant, Mr. Iverson.
At this meeting, Mr. Fisher, Judge Anderson, Mr. Hamilton, and
Mr. Iverson reviewed a document, prepared by Mr. Iverson,
stating that Mr. Hamilton's company "REALLY TOOK POSSESSION
JANUARY 1, 1993." Ex. 61. The document, entitled "PACIFIC
LANES PURCHASE PRICE ADJUSTMENTS PER DISCUSSIONS WITH GRANT
ANDERSON AND BILL HAMILTON," also states a purchase price
reduction of $92,829, resulting in a change from the original
purchase price of $300,000 to the adjusted purchase price of
$207,171. Id.
  According to Mr. Fisher, the March 1993 meeting
was very important because, as trustee, he had to make a final
decision about the actual closing date and possible adjustment
in purchase price. Mr. Fisher did not know the details of the
original agreement between Judge Anderson and Mr. Hamilton,
and did not know until late January 1993 that there was any
agreement between Judge Anderson and Mr. Hamilton to adjust
the purchase price of the bowling alley. As

July 1999     IN RE DISCIPLINE OF ANDERSON              7
                     Cause No. JD 14

a result, in deciding to make a purchase price adjustment
for the bowling alley, Mr. Fisher relied on Judge Anderson,
Mr. Hamilton, and Mr. Iverson for information about the
nature of the transaction in September 1992. In October
1993, Mr. Hamilton, through Pacific Recreation Enterprises,
Inc., purchased the land and buildings on which the bowling
alley was located. Judge Anderson, as president of both
Pacific Lanes, Inc., and Hoffman-Stevenson, Inc., executed
the various closing documents, such as the Statutory
Warranty Deed, Termination of Lease document, and Real
Estate Excise Tax Affidavit.

Acceptance of the car loan payments
  On December 24, 1992, Judge Anderson purchased a Cadillac El
Dorado. Judge Anderson took out a loan from Sound Bank in
Tacoma in which he and Mr. Hamilton were shareholders.
  On January 5, 1993, the car dealership delivered the car to
Judge Anderson. Diane Anderson, who was married to Judge
Anderson at the time, testified that she was surprised when he
came home with the new Cadillac. According to Ms. Anderson,
sometime after Judge Anderson came home with the car they
discussed how the car payments would be made. Ms. Anderson
recalled that Judge Anderson told her he had just sold the
bowling alley, and that the Cadillac was a commission similar to
what a realtor would receive. She testified that Judge Anderson
told her Mr. Hamilton was making the payments on the car.
  On or about January 8, 1993, the day he was sworn in as
Superior Court Judge, Mr. Hamilton made arrangements to pay for
Judge Anderson's car loan.

8             IN RE DISCIPLINE OF ANDERSON      July 1999
                     Cause No. JD 14

Mr. Hamilton testified that he made the offer when Judge
Anderson came into his bank to make a payment of $9,000 on
the car loan. Mr. Hamilton and Judge Anderson met in Mr.
Hamilton's office at the bank. According to Mr. Hamilton,
they happened to discuss Judge Anderson's new Cadillac. Mr.
Hamilton testified that Judge Anderson brought up the fact
that the car loan was a financial obligation he took
seriously. Mr. Hamilton testified:
    And so it reminded me at that time that, my gosh, I had
  never ever gotten a bill from him ever for 15 years' worth
  of services. . . . It was that kind of a relationship. We
  were friends. He's as good a male friend as I have.
    And so I remember saying, gosh, I felt kind of cheap at
  that time, because attorneys cost a lot of money. I've
  spent a lot of money on attorneys, and I'd never spent a
  dime for the advice and counsel and friendship that I had
  gotten from Grant.
  . . . .
    So I said, "Let me pay you something for your services,"
  and that's how that came about. I couldn't just walk up to
  him and say, "Here." That would humiliate him. He didn't
  want anything. He wasn't in a position to take anything, he
  explained to me. And I said, "Well, you can take a gift. I
  can give you a gift, can I not?" and he said, "Yes."
  So to make it palatable to him in my mind, I said, well,
  you know, I'm not just going to hand him a check or hand
  him some cash or something of that nature. That would have
  not been socially acceptable to him, so let's make it
  something that he can live with.
    And it was $800, is the way I looked at it. It was $800 a
  month, and I said, "Let me make some payments on your
  Cadillac."

Verbatim Report of Proceedings (RP) at 260-62.

July 1999     IN RE DISCIPLINE OF ANDERSON              9
                     Cause No. JD 14

  According to Judge Anderson, he initially declined Mr.
Hamilton's offer of the car loan payments, but stated that Mr.
Hamilton insisted. "And as he was a friend, I don't know quite
how to explain this, but say it would almost have been an
affront to him to say, 'I just absolutely will not,' he became
that insistent, and so I said okay." RP at 630-31. Judge
Anderson and Mr. Hamilton did not discuss how much or how long
the monthly payments would continue.
  Between January 1993 and May 1995, Mr. Hamilton made monthly
payments on Judge Anderson's Cadillac, totaling $31,185, out of
the business account of his company Pacific Recreation
Enterprises, Inc. The payments were treated as an expense on the
accounting books of Pacific Recreation Enterprises, Inc., and
deducted as an expense on the company's tax returns. Although
Mr. Hamilton testified that he was accustomed to giving monetary
gifts, his monthly payments on Judge Anderson's Cadillac was the
only gift he ever documented as a business expense, deductible
on his company's tax returns.
  Judge Anderson testified that he did not disclose the car
loan payments to Mr. Fisher, trustee for the estate, and did
not indicate the receipt of car loan payments on his filings
with the Public Disclosure Commission because he understood
the car loan payments to be a gift.

  Judge continuing to serve as president of estate's corporations
  In mid-October 1993, after Mr. Hamilton purchased the land
and buildings on which the bowling alley was located, Judge
Anderson resigned as president of Hoffman-Stevenson, Inc.,
Pacific Lanes, Inc., and Surfside Inn, Inc.

10            IN RE DISCIPLINE OF ANDERSON      July 1999
                     Cause No. JD 14

  Testimony by both Judge Anderson and Mr. Fisher, the trustee
of the Hoffman estate, indicated that the late resignation
was a mere oversight on the part of one of the lawyers in
Mr. Fisher's law firm. Other testimony by Judge Anderson
himself, and the trustee, indicated, however, that Judge
Anderson was asked to stay on as president after January
1993 to wrap-up his work on the Hoffman estate. According to
Mr. Fisher, it was not until March 1993, that he requested
his law firm take steps to remove Judge Anderson as
president of the estate's corporations.
  Judge Anderson explained that Mr. Fisher asked him to stay on
as president of the estate's corporations for the first few
months after he was sworn in as Superior Court Judge. Judge
Anderson testified that he agreed because he believed the Code
of Judicial Conduct allowed a judge a reasonable amount of
time to wrap-up work on estates. As for the additional seven
months, in 1993, Judge Anderson and Mr. Fisher testified that
Judge Anderson's participation in the transactions after March
was limited to signing documents as president of
Hoffman-Stevenson, Inc. and Pacific Lanes, Inc.
  On August 4, 1997, the Commission filed a Statement of Charges
against Judge Anderson, alleging seven violations of Canons 1,
2(A), 5(C)(3), and 6(C) of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The
alleged actions were based on Judge Anderson's role as personal
representative of a deceased client's estate, subsequent
transactions he engaged in as president of two companies
belonging to

July 1999     IN RE DISCIPLINE OF ANDERSON             11
                     Cause No. JD 14

the estate, and acceptance of three years' worth of loan
payments for his car. Judge Anderson contested the charges.
  The Commission held a five-day fact-finding hearing from
January 12 to January 16, 1998. On April 3, 1998, the
Commission filed its decision, dismissing four of the
charges but concluding that Judge Anderson committed
violations of Canons 1, 2(A), 5(C)(3), and 6(C) by: (1)
continuing to serve as president of the estate's
corporations through October 1993; (2) accepting car loan
payments from Mr. Hamilton while simultaneously negotiating
a price reduction of $92,829 for the bowling alley business
purchased by Mr. Hamilton's company; and (3) failing to
report his receipt of the car payments on his public
disclosure filings for 1993, 1994 and 1995. Commission
Decision at 4-7. The Commission censured Judge Anderson and
recommended suspension for four months without pay. The
Commission also ordered Judge Anderson to take a "course of
corrective action" by attending a Commission-approved course
on Judicial Ethics and amending his filings with the Public
Disclosure Commission to reflect payments on the Cadillac
made by Mr. Hamilton. Commission Decision at 9.
  Counsel for the Commission moved for reconsideration, urging
the Commission to change its suspension recommendation to
removal of Judge Anderson. Judge Anderson responded, and also
moved for reconsideration on the issue of the Commission's
authority to order a corrective course of action in addition
to the censure and recommended suspension. On May 1, 1998, the
Commission denied both motions. Pursuant to Discipline Rules
for Judges (DRJ)

12            IN RE DISCIPLINE OF ANDERSON      July 1999
                     Cause No. JD 14

2(a) and Commission on Judicial Conduct Rules of Procedure
(CJCRP) 25(b), the Commission filed its decision with this
court, on May 15, 1998. Judge Anderson filed a timely Notice
of Contest.

                          ANALYSIS
  The Washington Constitution sets forth the procedure to be
followed in the case of judicial discipline. Const. art. IV,
sec. 31 (amend. 77).
  COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL CONDUCT.
    (1) There shall be a commission on judicial conduct, existing
  as an independent agency of the judicial branch, and consisting
  of a judge selected by and from the court of appeals judges, a
  judge selected by and from the superior court judges, a judge
  selected by and from the district court judges, two persons
  admitted to the practice of law in this state selected by the
  state bar association, and six persons who are not attorneys
  appointed by the governor.
    (2) Whenever the commission receives a complaint against a
  judge or justice, or otherwise has reason to believe that a
  judge or justice should be admonished, reprimanded, censured,
  suspended, removed, or retired, the commission shall first
  investigate the complaint or belief and then conduct initial
  proceedings for the purpose of determining whether probable
  cause exists for conducting a public hearing or hearings to deal
  with the complaint or belief. The investigation and initial
  proceedings shall be confidential. Upon beginning an initial
  proceeding, the commission shall notify the judge or justice of
  the existence of and basis for the initial proceeding.
    (3) Whenever the commission concludes, based on an initial
  proceeding, that there is probable cause to believe that a judge
  or justice has violated a rule of judicial conduct or that the
  judge or justice suffers from a disability which is permanent or
  likely to become permanent and which seriously interferes with
  the performance of judicial duties, the commission shall conduct
  a public hearing or hearings and shall make public all those
  records of the initial proceeding that provide the basis for its
  conclusion. If the commission concludes that there is not
  probable cause, it shall notify the judge or justice of its conclusion.
    (4) Upon the completion of the hearing or hearings, the
  commission in open session shall either dismiss the case, or
  shall admonish, reprimand, or censure the judge or justice, or
  shall censure the judge or justice and recommend to the supreme
  court the suspension or removal of the judge or justice, or
  shall recommend to the supreme court the retirement of the judge
  or justice. The commission may not recommend suspension or
  removal unless it censures the judge or justice for the
  violation serving as the basis for the recommendation. The
  commission may recommend retirement of a judge or justice for a
  disability which is permanent or likely to become permanent and
  which seriously interferes with the performance of judicial duties.
    (5) Upon the recommendation of the commission, the supreme
  court may suspend, remove, or retire a judge or justice. The
  office of a judge or justice retired or removed by the supreme
  court becomes vacant, and that person is ineligible for judicial
  office until eligibility is reinstated by the supreme court. The
  salary of a removed judge or justice shall cease. The supreme
  court shall specify the effect upon salary when it suspends a
  judge or justice. The supreme court may not suspend, remove, or
  retire a judge or justice until the commission, after notice and
  hearing, recommends that action be taken, and the supreme court
  conducts a hearing, after notice, to review commission
  proceedings and findings against the judge or justice.
    (6) Within thirty days after the commission admonishes,
  reprimands, or censures a judge or justice, the judge or justice
  shall have a right of appeal de novo to the supreme court.
    (7) Any matter before the commission or supreme court may be
  disposed of by a stipulation entered into in a public
  proceeding. The stipulation shall be signed by the judge or
  justice and the commission or court. The stipulation may impose
  any terms and conditions deemed appropriate by the commission or
  court. A stipulation shall set forth all material facts relating
  to the proceeding and the conduct of the judge or justice.
    (8) Whenever the commission adopts a recommendation that a
  judge or justice be removed, the judge or justice shall be
  suspended immediately, with salary, from his or her judicial
  position until a final determination is made by the supreme court.

Const. art. IV, sec. 31 (amend. 77).

July 1999     IN RE DISCIPLINE OF ANDERSON             13
                     Cause No. JD 14

  [1,2] This Court reviews judicial disciplinary proceedings
de novo. In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Deming,
108 Wn.2d 82, 87-89, 736 P.2d 639, 744 P.2d 340 (1987). De novo
review of judicial disciplinary proceedings requires an
independent evaluation of the record as the Court is not
bound by the Commission's findings or conclusions. In re
Disciplinary Proceeding Against Turco, 137 Wn.2d 227, 246,
970 P.2d 731 (1999). De novo review does not mean that the
Supreme Court conducts a new evidentiary hearing. Rather,
this Court must independently determine if the judge
violated the Code of Judicial Conduct; and, if so, the
proper sanction to be imposed. Id. The Commission bears the
burden of proving factual findings by clear, cogent, and
convincing evidence. Id. In evaluating the evidence, we
necessarily give considerable weight to credibility
determinations by the Commission, as the body that had the
opportunity directly to observe the witnesses and their
demeanor. Id. Additionally, we give serious consideration to
the Commission's recommended sanctions. In re Disciplinary
Proceeding Against Ritchie, 123 Wn.2d 725, 870 P.2d 967
(1994). Nevertheless, the Commission's recommendation is
just that. The constitution's use of the word "recommend"
indicates an intent to place the ultimate decision to
discipline in the Supreme Court. Deming, 108 Wn.2d at 88.

                          VIOLATIONS
  1. Acceptance of car loan payments and the negotiation of sale
price reduction for bowling alley business.

14            IN RE DISCIPLINE OF ANDERSON      July 1999
                     Cause No. JD 14

  Judge Anderson was charged with violation of Canon 1 and Canon
2(A) based on his conduct surrounding the sale of the bowling
alley business, Pacific Lanes, Inc., and his receipt of car loan
payments during the negotiations surrounding that sale.
  Canon 1 provides:
  An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable
  to justice in our society. Judges should participate in
  establishing, maintaining, and enforcing high standards of
  judicial conduct, and shall personally observe those
  standards so that the integrity and independence of the
  judiciary will be preserved. The provisions of this Code
  are to be construed and applied to further that objective.

  Canon 2(A) reads that:
  Judges should respect and comply with the law and act at
  all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in
  the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.

See also 1998 Annual Report of the State of Washington
Commission on Judicial Conduct "Rules of Judicial Conduct"
app. D at 37. In this case, the Commission found in conclusion
5 that:

  Judge Anderson violated Canons 1 and 2(A) of the Code of
  Judicial Conduct by accepting an offer from William
  Hamilton to have his car loan payments made by William
  Hamilton during the same time Judge Anderson and William
  Hamilton negotiated a reduction of $92,829 in the amount
  owed by Hamilton's company, Pacific Recreation Enterprises,
  Inc., to Pacific Lanes, Inc. . . . . The result of Judge
  Anderson's actions, in accepting the payments from William
  Hamilton, had the president of a corporation, and a
  Superior Court Judge, receiving undisclosed compensation
  from the purchaser of that corporation's assets. This
  compensation ultimately totaled over 15% of the adjusted
  purchase price ($31,185/$200,000). The result of Judge
  Anderson's actions had trustee Steven Fisher, his former
  law partner, agreeing to a substantial price reduction
  without knowing that the former personal representative and
  current corporation president and Superior Court Judge was
  being paid by William Hamilton.

Commission Decision, conclusion 5.

July 1999     IN RE DISCIPLINE OF ANDERSON             15
                     Cause No. JD 14

  Judge Anderson raises several arguments in connection with the
Commission's conclusion. His first contention is that the record
does not support a finding that the car payments were made
simultaneously with the negotiation for price reduction. He also
argues that the record establishes the car payments were a gift
or, alternatively, the evidence is insufficient to support a
finding under the requisite standard of proof that the payments
were commissions paid in connection with the sale.
  Whether a violation of the Canons occurred in this case
largely turns on the credibility of Judge Anderson and Mr.
Hamilton and the documentary evidence. According to Judge
Anderson, the agreement to sell the bowling alley to Mr.
Hamilton was settled in August 1992, prior to his becoming a
Superior Court Judge and well before Mr. Hamilton offered to
take over his car loan payments. Judge Anderson argues that
he had little to do with the sale of the bowling alley
business once the estate had closed, and therefore suggests
that he was in no position to negotiate anything in exchange
for the car loan payments. Judge Anderson describes his role
in the subsequent transactions as limited to verifying
information for the trustee and the accountant. Judge
Anderson argues that he accepted the car loan payments as a
gift from a friend. He insists that he was reluctant to
accept the payments and did so only because he felt it was
important to Mr. Hamilton who had insisted on repaying him
for the years of "advice and counsel and friendship" prior
to becoming a Superior Court Judge. RP at 261.

16            IN RE DISCIPLINE OF ANDERSON      July 1999
                     Cause No. JD 14

  Judge Anderson testified that he accepted the car loan
payments because he knew that Mr. Hamilton could well afford to
make them, and that such an elaborate gift from Mr. Hamilton was
not unusual. Although Mr. Hamilton's testimony tends to
corroborate Judge Anderson, a review of the documentary evidence
casts grave doubt on their explanation. Indeed, the documents
establish that Judge Anderson not only continued to conduct
business on behalf of the estate and trust, but also demonstrate
that subsequent transactions regarding the sale of the bowling
alley business were negotiated at the same time Judge Anderson
was receiving car loan payments from Mr. Hamilton.
  The first draft of the Business Acquisition and Lease
Agreement in August 1992 left several important terms of the
sale of the bowling alley business unresolved. Negotiation of
these terms continued well after Judge Anderson was sworn in as
a Superior Court Judge. Judge Anderson and Mr. Hamilton signed a
second draft of the Business Acquisition and Lease Agreement in
August 1992; however, that agreement was revised one month
later. The final contract of sale was not signed until September
19, 1992, and expressly conditioned closing on the issuance and
transfer of gambling and liquor licenses. To satisfy those
contingencies, Judge Anderson submitted applications to the
Washington State Gambling Commission in late September 1992, and
the Washington State Liquor Control Board in October 1992. On
December 4, 1992, Judge Anderson executed a bill of sale for the
bowling alley business to Pacific Recreation Enterprises, Inc.,

July 1999     IN RE DISCIPLINE OF ANDERSON             17
                     Cause No. JD 14

with the purchase price listed as $300,000. On that same day,
Mr. Hamilton issued a promissory note in the amount of $250,000,
which Judge Anderson in turn pledged as a security agreement to
First Interstate Bank. Contrary to Judge Anderson's assertion
that his agreement with Mr. Hamilton anticipated a later price
adjustment, none of those documents suggest such an arrangement.
  Judge Anderson nevertheless insists that he and Mr. Hamilton
understood that the sale was contingent upon Mr. Hamilton
receiving the cash flow from the fall season, the most
profitable period for the bowling alley. They testified that the
reason for a September 1 closing date was to ensure Mr. Hamilton
would receive these funds. In order to offset the delayed
closing date, Judge Anderson explains he and Mr. Hamilton
anticipated that a later adjustment to the sale price would be
necessary. However, unlike the gambling and liquor licenses
contingencies, none of the documents reflect this cash flow
contingency.
  Additionally, both Judge Anderson and Mr. Hamilton testified
that when the sale did not close as planned, Mr. Hamilton took
over management of the bowling alley. Mr. Hamilton was expecting
some adjustment to be made later to account for the fall cash
flows he was to have received. Thus, Judge Anderson contends the
price reduction had been agreed to well before the March 9, 1993
meeting.
  Again, documentary evidence does not support this testimony.
Nothing in the Business Acquisition and Lease Agreement mentions
a price adjustment, fall cash flow, or Mr. Hamilton's company
taking on management duties prior to

18            IN RE DISCIPLINE OF ANDERSON      July 1999
                     Cause No. JD 14

closing. Instead, Judge Anderson's law firm was charging
Pacific Lanes, Inc. $1,800 a month to manage the business
during that period. Further, when Judge Anderson submitted a
signed application to renew the gambling license for the
bowling alley, the application, which required a listing of
"[a]ll managers/supervisors involved in [the] gambling
activity(ies)[,]" did not name Mr. Hamilton. RP at 53; Ex. 1.
  The documentary evidence arising out of the March 1993 meeting
also belies the claim that Judge Anderson had little to do with
the sale after the estate was transferred to a trust in January
1993. Although Judge Anderson testified that his role in the
price reduction was limited to verifying information for the
trustee and accountant, the discussions regarding the price
reduction were recorded as "PACIFIC LANES PURCHASE PRICE
ADJUSTMENTS PER DISCUSSIONS WITH GRANT ANDERSON AND BILL
HAMILTON." That same document indicated that Mr. Hamilton
"really took possession January 1, 1993" and that he would
receive a reduction of $92, 829 in the amount owing on the sale.
Ex. 61. Moreover, while Judge Anderson testified that he has no
independent recollection of how the price adjustment occurred,
the trustee and accountant testified that they relied on him for
information on how to proceed.
  Judge Anderson served as president of Pacific Lanes, Inc. in
addition to the estate's two other corporations until
mid-October 1993, and resigned only after he executed the
closing documents for Mr. Hamilton's purchase of the land and
building which housed Pacific Lanes, Inc. His role as president
is inconsistent

July 1999     IN RE DISCIPLINE OF ANDERSON             19
                     Cause No. JD 14

with his claim that he was in no legal position to negotiate
anything in exchange for the car loan payments. Judge
Anderson concedes that he remained in the capacity of
president, but he contends that he only agreed to stay at
the request of the trustee and that his role was limited to
verifying information regarding his prior work on the
estate. Judge Anderson's participation in the March 1993
meeting, and records of that meeting, show that his role was
not so limited.
  We find it is more than coincidental that the discussions
about price reduction occurred just after Judge Anderson
began accepting car loan payments from Mr. Hamilton. Judge
Anderson's testimony that the car loan payments were a gift,
unrelated to the sale of the bowling alley business, is
simply not credible. Soon after the car dealership delivered
the Cadillac to Judge Anderson in January 1993, Judge
Anderson discussed the car loan payments with Mr. Hamilton
in his office. It was then that Mr. Hamilton offered to take
over the car loan payments on Judge Anderson's newly
purchased Cadillac. According to their testimony, they did
not determine how much nor how long Mr. Hamilton would make
payments. Around the same time, Judge Anderson informed his
then wife, Diane Anderson, that Mr. Hamilton had arranged to
make the car loan payments on the Cadillac. Ms. Anderson
testified that she remembered discussing the purchase of the
car because she was surprised by the purchase and concerned
about the car loan payments. Judge Anderson then told his
wife that the new Cadillac was like a commission for selling
the bowling alley business to Mr. Hamilton.

20            IN RE DISCIPLINE OF ANDERSON      July 1999
                     Cause No. JD 14

  Although Judge Anderson contends that Ms. Anderson's
testimony is unreliable, other evidence establishes that the car
loan payments were not a gift. The three years' worth of car
loan payments were characterized as a necessary and ordinary
business expense on Mr. Hamilton's company books and federal
income tax returns. Mr. Hamilton treated the car loan payments
as a necessary and ordinary business expense on the company
books and a tax- deductible item for Pacific Recreation
Enterprises, Inc. That same company is the entity through which
Mr. Hamilton acquired the estate's bowling alley business. Mr.
Hamilton concedes that the car loan payments made for Judge
Anderson were the only kind of "gift" he had documented in such
a way. RP at 289.
  Both Judge Anderson and Mr. Hamilton claim they were unaware
that the payments were treated as deductible expenses and that a
bookkeeping and accounting error had been made. Judge Anderson
maintains he was oblivious of the actual source of payments,
while Mr. Hamilton explains that it was an administrative
oversight he failed to correct with his accountant. We are
unconvinced that Mr. Hamilton, a sophisticated businessman who
by his own testimony is accustomed to giving such elaborate
gifts, would overlook such an obvious error.
  Ultimately, the Commission found Judge Anderson's testimony
describing his role in the price reduction of the bowling alley
business, and the basis of his acceptance of the car loan
payments, not credible in light of the overwhelming evidence and
testimony indicating that the two events were directly related. The

July 1999     IN RE DISCIPLINE OF ANDERSON             21
                     Cause No. JD 14

evidence supports that determination. The Commission has met
its burden of proving that Judge Anderson's acceptance of the
car loan payments was, in fact, consideration for negotiating
the sale of the Hoffman estate's bowling alley business.
  Judge Anderson also claims that conclusion 5 of the
Commission's Decision included an impermissible finding of
fact, i.e., that he may have violated a fiduciary duty, as
either a personal representative or corporate officer. He
argues that conclusion 5 must be rejected because he was not
charged with breaching his fiduciary duty. Conclusion 5 of
the Commission's Decision states in relevant part:
  Judge Anderson violated Canons 1 and 2(A) of the Code of
  Judicial Conduct by accepting an offer from William
  Hamilton to have his car loan payments made by William
  Hamilton during the same time Judge Anderson and William
  Hamilton negotiated a reduction of $92,829 in the amount
  owed by Hamilton's company, Pacific Recreation Enterprises,
  Inc., to Pacific Lanes, Inc. . . .The result of Judge
  Anderson's actions had trustee Steven Fisher, his former
  law partner, agreeing to a substantial price reduction
  without knowing that the former personal representative and
  current corporation president and Superior Court Judge was
  being paid by William Hamilton. The public confidence in
  the integrity of the judiciary is substantially eroded by
  such actions. Judicial integrity, if not the fiduciary duty
  of a personal representative or a corporation president,
  required Judge Anderson to disclose his agreement to
  receive over $31,000 from Hamilton.

Commission Decision at 6 (conclusion 5).
  The Commission did not base its conclusion that Judge Anderson
violated Canons 1 and 2(A) on a finding that the Judge had
violated a fiduciary duty. Rather, the misconduct at issue was
the negotiation of a sale price reduction for the bowling alley
business concurrent with the receipt of three years' worth of

22            IN RE DISCIPLINE OF ANDERSON      July 1999
                     Cause No. JD 14

loan payments which Judge Anderson failed to disclose to Mr.
Fisher, the trustee, and the Public Disclosure Commission. While
Judge Anderson may also have violated his fiduciary obligations,
such a finding is not necessary for the conclusion that Judge
Anderson's conduct fell far short of the standards articulated
in Canons 1 and 2(A).
  [3] Finally, Judge Anderson argues a finding
of violation is unwarranted based on the circumstances
surrounding the sale of the bowling alley because his actions
were unrelated to how he would act as a judge and were private
in nature. Judge Anderson contends that, unlike In re
Disciplinary Proceeding Against Kaiser, 111 Wn.2d 275, 759 P.2d
392 (1988), for example, where censure was imposed on a judge
who pledged partial treatment and suggested that driving while
intoxicated attorneys could buy favorable treatment from their
clients, his private conduct at issue is irrelevant to his
official capacity as a judge. The Canons apply equally to the
judicial and extra- judicial behavior of judges.
  Indeed, this Court has broadly interpreted its authority to
examine and to discipline for extra-judicial behavior of
judges. Turco, 137 Wn.2d 227. In Turco, this Court found that
a judge who shoved his wife to the ground in a public place,
an incident that occurred outside of the courtroom,
constituted a violation of the Canons. Granted, because not
all reprehensible conduct necessarily reflects adversely on
the judiciary (or merits judicial discipline), we held that
there must be an articulable nexus between the conduct at
issue and the performance of judicial duties. Id. Here, the
nexus is clear between Judge Anderson's judicial

July 1999     IN RE DISCIPLINE OF ANDERSON             23
                     Cause No. JD 14

duty under Canons 1, 2(A), 5(C)(3), and 6(C) and the
pattern, nature, and extent of his extra-judicial conduct in
question. As the Commission points out, Judge Anderson seeks
shelter in the fact that his conduct occurred outside of the
courtroom. That does not eliminate, however, the profound
impact of such conduct on the public's perceptions of the
judiciary. Moreover, the Canons anticipate that such issues
relating to extra-judicial conduct may arise. Principles of
judicial integrity implicate both judicial and
extra-judicial conduct.

2. Continued service as President of three corporations for
10 months.
  Canon 5(C)(3) of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides:
  Subject to the requirements of Canon 5(C)(1) and (2),
  judges may hold and manage investments, including real
  estate, and engage in other remunerative activity, but
  should not serve as officers, directors, managers, advisors
  or employees of any business.

Judge Anderson does not seriously dispute the fact that he
continued to serve as president of the Hoffman estate's three
corporations for 10 months after he was sworn-in as Pierce
County Superior Court Judge. As explained, the only argument he
advances in defense of his conduct is that once the estate was
closed and a trustee appointed, his participation in subsequent
transactions was limited to verifying information, and that his
failure to resign was a mere administrative oversight.
  Judge Anderson's explanation, however, is unconvincing in
light of the evidence and testimony by other witnesses
indicating that he did more than simply

24            IN RE DISCIPLINE OF ANDERSON      July 1999
                     Cause No. JD 14

verify information. Judge Anderson advised the trustee and
accountant of the price reduction. In March 1993, three
months after he became a Superior Court Judge, Judge
Anderson participated in the formal discussions to reduce
the amount owing by Mr. Hamilton. Judge Anderson did not
resign until October 1993, after he executed the closing
documents for Mr. Hamilton's additional purchase of the land
and building which housed the bowling alley business.
  Judge Anderson's dismissal of his prolonged role as an
executive officer of three corporations demonstrates a
careless disregard for the principles upon which the
judiciary is founded. Judge Anderson's willingness to
continue serving as president of the estate's corporations,
his active participation in the affairs of the trust, as
evidenced by his negotiation of the price reduction of the
bowling alley business, show that Judge Anderson failed to
seriously consider the inappropriate nature of his conduct.
Judge Anderson's continued role as president of the estate's
three corporations is indefensible.
  We are convinced that the evidence establishes by clear,
cogent, and convincing evidence that Judge Anderson violated
Canons 1, 2(A), 5(C)(3) of the Code of Judicial Conduct in
his role as president of the estate's corporations.

  3. Failure to report receipt of car loan payments on the
Public Disclosure Commission Filings for 1993, 1994, 1995.
  [4] Canon 6 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides:
  Judges may receive compensation and reimbursement of
  expenses for the quasi- judicial and extrajudicial
  activities permitted by this Code, if the source of such
  payments does not give the appearance of influencing the
  judges in their judicial duties or

July 1999     IN RE DISCIPLINE OF ANDERSON             25
                     Cause No. JD 14

  otherwise give the appearance of impropriety, subject to
  the following restrictions:
    . . . .
   (C) Public Reports. A judge shall make such financial
  disclosures as required by law.

  The acceptance of $31,185 in car loan payments from Mr.
Hamilton was compensation. Judge Anderson failed to disclose
such compensation in his public disclosure filings for the
years 1993 ($9,600), 1994 ($9,600), and 1995 ($11,985). His
failure to report this compensation plainly violated Canon
6(C).
  The Commission has met its burden in proving that Judge
Anderson's conduct was in violation of Canons 1, 2(A), and
6(C).

                           SANCTIONS
  The Commission ordered Judge Anderson to attend a judicial
ethics course and amend his filings with the Public Disclosure
Commission, and suspended him for four months without pay. Judge
Anderson challenges each of these sanctions.
  [5,6] As stated at the outset of our analysis, this court gives
serious consideration to the Commission's recommended sanctions,
but is not bound by those recommendations. In re Disciplinary
Proceeding Against Turco, 137 Wn.2d 227, 246, 970 P.2d 731
(1999); In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Ritchie,
123 Wn.2d 725, 870 P.2d 967 (1994); In re Disciplinary Proceeding
Against Deming, 108 Wn.2d 82, 88, 736 P.2d 639, 744 P.2d 340
(1987). Article IV, section 31(5) of the Washington State
Constitution provides that "[u]pon the recommendation of the
commission, the Supreme Court may suspend, remove, or retire a
judge or justice." (Emphasis added.)  The court may not impose a
sanction, however, until,

26            IN RE DISCIPLINE OF ANDERSON      July 1999
                     Cause No. JD 14

following notice and a hearing, the commission "recommends
that action be taken" and this court has conducted a hearing,
after notice, to review commission proceedings and the
commission's findings. Id. The constitution specifically
requires that before this court considers imposing a sanction
the Commission must investigate a complaint against a judge
or justice or investigate a belief that a sanction should be
imposed, determine based on an initial proceeding that
probable cause exists to believe a judge or justice has
violated a rule of judicial conduct or suffers from a
disability interfering with performance of judicial duties,
and conduct a public hearing before making a recommendation
that this court impose a sanction. See Const. art. IV, sec.
31(2), (3), (4). These provisions assure that the Commission
carries out its constitutionally mandated role of
investigating, determining probable cause, and holding a
public hearing, so that before this court considers sanctions
the allegations or belief of misconduct or disability are
examined and due process is afforded the judge or justice.
While the constitution requires that there be a
recommendation that some action be taken, the constitution
does not limit this court's role merely to approving or
reversing the Commission's recommended sanctions.
  To the contrary, the constitution expressly grants the judge
or justice the "right of appeal de novo" to the Supreme
Court. Const. art. IV, sec. 31(6). As we explained in Turco,
137 Wn.2d at 246 n.5, the constitutional right of appeal de
novo involves judicial review from which we make our own
determination of the facts and of the law, including our own
determination of the appropriate sanction.

July 1999     IN RE DISCIPLINE OF ANDERSON             27
                     Cause No. JD 14

  In this case, we do not agree with the Commission's
recommended sanctions. Most importantly, we find a four-month
suspension far too lenient under the circumstances in this
case. Instead, the appropriate sanction is removal of Judge
Anderson from his judicial office.
  [7] In determining the appropriate sanction for judicial
misconduct, this court considers:
  (a) whether the misconduct is an isolated instance or
  evidenced a pattern of conduct; (b) the nature, extent and
  frequency of occurrence of the acts of misconduct; (c)
  whether the misconduct occurred in or out of the courtroom;
  (d) whether the misconduct occurred in the judge's official
  capacity or in his private life; (e) whether the judge has
  acknowledged or recognized that the acts occurred; (f)
  whether the judge has evidenced an effort to change or
  modify his conduct; (g) the length of service on the bench;
  (h) whether there have been prior complaints about this
  judge; (i) the effect the misconduct has upon the integrity
  of and respect for the judiciary; and (j) the extent to
  which the judge exploited his position to satisfy his
  personal desires.

Deming, 108 Wn.2d at 119-20. See also CJCRP 6(c).
  Judge Anderson claims that his actions were not part of a
pattern or did not occur with frequency. This claim ignores
the overwhelming evidence to the contrary. An independent
review of the record establishes that Judge Anderson's
misconduct was not isolated, but occurred over a period of
three years. Judge Anderson continued to serve as president
of the estate's corporations. His participation in the
affairs of the estate and trust were not minimal, as shown
by his direct participation in the negotiations to reduce
the price of the bowling alley business in favor of his
friend Mr. Hamilton. Even after facilitating the price

28            IN RE DISCIPLINE OF ANDERSON      July 1999
                     Cause No. JD 14

reduction, Judge Anderson remained as president of the
estate's corporations, long enough to execute the final
documents for Mr. Hamilton's additional purchase of the land
and building which housed the bowling alley business.
  [8] Judicial integrity and a judge's duty to avoid the
appearance of impropriety prohibited Judge Anderson from
accepting the car loan payments from Mr. Hamilton while
negotiating the sale of the bowling alley, and required him,
at the least, to disclose those payments on his public
disclosure filings. Clearly, Judge Anderson's continued
participation in the affairs of the estate after he became a
Superior Court Judge, and his failure to disclose his
receipt of the payments he received over a period of three
years demonstrate an extended pattern of misconduct.
  In the face of such overwhelming evidence, however, Judge
Anderson refuses to admit that he received the car loan
payments while participating in subsequent discussions to
reduce the price of the bowling alley business in favor of
Mr. Hamilton. Judge Anderson's failure to acknowledge or
recognize that he committed any misconduct at all weighs
heavily against him in our determination of the appropriate
sanction.
  In continuing to serve as president of the estate's
corporations, Judge Anderson never evidenced an effort to
change or modify his conduct. Judge Anderson believes that
because the incidents occurred a number of years ago, it
would be impossible for him to show an effort to change or
modify his conduct. Opening Br. of Resp't Judge at 48.
Moreover, Judge Anderson argues that the

July 1999     IN RE DISCIPLINE OF ANDERSON             29
                     Cause No. JD 14

only reason to sanction the alleged misconduct is because of
the effect of such conduct on the integrity of and respect
for the judiciary, and that his alleged violations of the
Canons are insignificant and do not warrant sanction.
  This argument demonstrates Judge Anderson's complete failure
to understand or his willful denial of the magnitude of his
misconduct. It demonstrates his disregard of the importance of
the integrity of the judiciary, both in the sense of the
individual judge's personal integrity and in the sense of the
integrity of our justice system. The judicial branch of
government depends upon the public's confidence and respect.
Judge Anderson's misconduct has eroded the integrity and respect
for the judiciary to such a degree that he must be relieved of
the duties of office. See RCW 2.64.010(5).
  We note that the Commission considered four mitigating
factors: the misconduct occurred outside of the courtroom; the
misconduct was not committed in Judge Anderson's official
capacity as a judge except as to his duty to comply with the
financial disclosure laws; Judge Anderson served as a part-time
municipal judge and superior court judge for 14 years; and Judge
Anderson's position as a judge was not exploited to engage in
the misconduct. Commission Decision at 8. We find none of these
factors sufficient to justify a sanction less than removal.

30            IN RE DISCIPLINE OF ANDERSON      July 1999
                     Cause No. JD 14

  In Ritchie, 123 Wn.2d at 732, a district court judge was
removed because he was found to have repeatedly
misrepresented the purpose of his travel as judicial
business when seeking reimbursement for car and lodging
expenses. Although the purpose of his trips to Jamaica,
Arizona, and Florida was personal, the judge would
characterize his travel as a "conference" or "law related
education" when in fact judicial business was wholly
incidental to the purpose of his trips. Id. Such conduct,
this Court found, warranted the judge's removal in light of
the pattern of misconduct and the extent to which the judge,
in his official and personal capacity, acted dishonestly.
Ritchie, 123 Wn.2d at 736.
  Here, Judge Anderson's continued participation in the sale of
the bowling alley business, his deliberate failure to disclose
payments on his public disclosure filings, and his attempt to
misrepresent the car loan payments as a gift clearly exhibit a
pattern of dishonest behavior unbecoming of a judge. Judge
Anderson's refusal to acknowledge the enormity of the effect of
his conduct on the integrity of the judiciary and the public's
confidence further demonstrates his unfitness for judicial
office. Given the egregious nature and extent of Judge
Anderson's misconduct, the Commission's recommendation of
suspension for four months without pay is too lenient, and
removal from office is the appropriate sanction.

July 1999     IN RE DISCIPLINE OF ANDERSON             31
                     Cause No. JD 14

  Next, we turn briefly to the Commission's remaining
recommendations. The Commission ordered that Judge Anderson
attend a judicial ethics class and amend his filings with the
Public Disclosure Commission. Because we remove him from office,
these sanctions are unnecessary. /4  Judge Anderson will not be
eligible for judicial office in the future unless his
eligibility is reinstated by this Court. Const. art. IV, sec. 5;
DRJ 10(a). Accordingly, we reverse the Commission's order of
correction action.

                           CONCLUSION
   We hereby order Judge Anderson's removal from office.

  DURHAM, SMITH, and IRELAND, JJ., and MORGAN, SHIELDS, SWEENEY,
and WINSOR, JJ., Pro Tem., concur.

_______________
  4 We also note that penalties for violation of our state
public disclosure laws are provided for by statute.